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**The weaker sex?**

**A study on the impact of Judges' sex in the verdicts of child support cases**

Roberto Asmat, Lajos Kossuth

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*Abstract*

We study the role played by the Judges' sex in the sentencing in the context of child support cases where a mother (plaintiff) sues a father (defendant). We built a novel and rich database for this study using text documents of verdicts on child support trials in Peru. In particular, we analyze two outcomes from verdicts: father punishment and mother success. Causal identification is achieved through the particular Peruvian institutional design which provides a unique opportunity to establish causal links since judges are randomly assigned in this type of trials. We found preliminary but systematic evidence that female judges punish defendants more and grant a higher degree of success to plaintiffs. Results generate direct policy implications on how to improve the design of fair trials such as implementing an objective indicator of child support alimony determination.

## **I. Introduction**

There is overwhelming evidence on the determining role sex plays in getting favorable or unfavorable results in judicial sentences (Sentencing Advisory Council, 2010; Starr, 2012; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Doerner & Demuth, 2014). Concretely, the relatively immutable fact of being a woman makes it less likely, on average, to get harsher sentences for equal crimes, to be retained in preventive confinement, to be obliged to pay higher bail fees, or to even be sentenced to prison.

What has gained much less traction in academia, however, is the study of the role played by the Judges' sex in the sentencing –although some efforts have been made for the context of developed countries (Lim, Silveira, & Snyder, 2016; Coontz, 2000; Jeandidier et al., 2016)-. Men might decide differently than women in specific contexts. Indeed, when it comes to labor market decisions, for instance, while one could expect female evaluators to be more attracted to female candidates, the empirical evidence actually suggest that women are biased against other women and end up being hired less than their male counterparts (Bagues & Esteve-Volart, 2010). Furthermore, on academic contexts female researchers are more poorly rated by female reviewers than by male ones (Broder, 1993).

We believe this issue is especially important in the context of child support cases. Being our grounded suspicion that sex and gender role stereotypes play a fundamental role in not only the outcome of these kind of cases, but also in the law created to regulate them (eg. Baca Calderón, 2015; Arzola Mora, 2006; Hernández, 2015), trying to understand how Judges make their decisions is of vital importance for the development of the law and for the guaranteeing of impartiality in the judicial proceedings people make take part in.

Therefore, our research objective will be to determine whether or not there is a causal relationship between the Judges' sex and the severity and success of the verdicts in child support cases for the Peruvian context. We hypothesize that female judges will tend to empathize more than male judges with the female plaintiffs and therefore will end up favor them with their verdicts. This idea will be evaluated through two mechanisms: a) a measure of severity – the amount of alimony sentenced divided by the defendants' income; b) a measure of success – the amount of alimony sentenced divided by the amount demanded by the plaintiff.

We estimate that, due to the methodological design to be explained in the following sections and the possibility of accessing a very rich database, our results will allow for the original exploration of an empirical relationship for which almost none causal evidence exists, especially

regarding the Peruvian context. The Peruvian institutional design provides a unique opportunity to establish causality since judges are randomly assigned in this type of trials and, therefore, the judge's gender will also randomly assigned and thus uncorrelated with the observable and unobservable variables.

This paper will be structured as follows. First we will detail the judicial decision making process in child support cases and the research regarding the relationship between sex/gender and decision making. Then the database and model will be described. Thirdly, we will define the methodology and the identification strategy. Then we will review and analyze the results with relation to the hypothesis. Finally, we will discuss some implications and provide recommendations for public policy.

## **II. Judicial decision making in child support cases and the influence of sex**

Article N°481 of the Peruvian Civil Code gives the only criteria for a judge to follow while deciding on the amount of the alimony to set: a) the needs of whoever is demanding alimony (underage children); b) the economic possibilities of the defendant and other obligations he/she may have. It is also stated in the Article, however, that it is not necessary to thoroughly investigate the defendant's income in order to sentence (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2015). There are no other guidelines for judges, save for the fact that the maximum amount of alimony a judge decides to set can only represent 60% of the defendant's income and that a three-month failure to comply with the payments generates criminal responsibility (Hernández, 2015).

Concretely, the Peruvian judicial system does not provide a clear and transparent measure for the determination of child support alimony. This fact proves to be sort of unique when comparing the Peruvian system with other countries. In the US, for example, scales have been designed to orient judges in their decision making regarding alimony (Rothe et al., 2011). Canada has also developed scales that vary according to the number of children subject to alimony, the defendant's annual income before taxes and the region where both the plaintiff and the defendant live. This scale, it is worth stating, is available online for everyone to use (Department of Justice, 2016). Another interesting case is found in France, where judges utilize a comprehensive indicator whose objective is to determine the subsistence level of families (Sayn, 2002).

This evidence suggests that Peruvian judges possess much more discretion to decide on child support settlements than their peers in other countries, independently of sex or gender. In spite

of being Peru a civil law country, where judges are expected to act as anonymous interpreters of the law, in child support cases Peruvian judges display the discretion expected in common law systems (Schultz & Shaw, 2006). This of course allows for all sorts of personal characteristics to influence judgments (financial and marital status, gender, sex, ethnicity, moral values or even religion) and reduce the likelihood of neutrality, which is exactly what the judicial system should try to prevent.

Does the sex of the judge exert special influence in discretionary judicial proceedings, then? For example, there is evidence for Huancavelica, in Peru, that child support cases are indeed biased against men (Carhuapoma Tuncar, 2015). However, there is no evidence suggesting in which manner the sex of the judge has influenced this bias. Indeed, empirical support for this assertion is mixed (Jeandidier et al., 2016).

Some general attempts at discovering systematic differences have been made, though. Minority female judges from the US Court of Appeals, for instance, were found to be more likely than males to support the claims of the defendants (Collins & Moyer, 2008). Also studying the US Court of Appeals, Sheurer (2014) found that female judges were more likely to take a liberal stance regarding economic and civil issues if the circuit was comprised by female at least in a 15% ratio (Jeandidier et al., 2016). On the other hand, while evidence was found that in Brazil female judges tend to be less generous than male judges in alimony sentences (Junqueira, 2003), this result was not replicable in the Netherlands (Dijksterhuis, 2013)

It is argued that sex-related differences in judicial decision making characterize men as objective, neutral and equidistant, while women are thought of as caring, vocational and more prone to like being involved with persons (Jeandidier et al., 2016). This idea, however, relates only to the decision making process, not necessarily to the outcome, which seems to contradict the evidence cited in the previous paragraph.

A more nuanced characterization that might help explain the differences (if any) between men and women in judicial decision making can be found in Boyd et al. (2010). The authors dissect different sentencing decisions between men and women into four accounts: *different voice*, *representational*, *informational*, and *organizational*.

The *different voice* account suggests that male and females develop different worldviews and define themselves as distinctively connected to society. The *representational* account posits that female judges act as representatives of their gender and will try to defend its interests directly. The *informational* account argues, moreover, that women possess unique information that

comes from shared experiences. Finally, the *organizational* account suggests on the contrary that there are no differences between how judges undergo training, obtain their jobs or confront constraints regardless of sex (Boyd et al. 2010).

Some environmental theories on sex-based judicial decision making have also been posited. Critical mass theory, for example, suggests that small minority groups will tend to conform to the social norms set by the majority of the organization. Analogously, the hypothesis regarding the judicial system is that, the higher the number of women that ‘join the organization’, the more acceptable it will be for them to deviate from the male behaviour that sets the social norms within said organization (Sheurer, 2014).

Overall, three distinct assertions can be made after the previous literature review. First, that the decision making process regarding child support cases in Peru is basically discretionary, contrary to what would be expected in a civil law system. Second, that the empirical discussion related to whether the judicial sentences are systematically different if the judge is male or female is not yet settled. Finally, that there might be both individual and contextual determinants shaping these theorized differences between men and women when sentencing cases.

These three insights will be fundamental for the empirical strategy and the analysis of the results.

### **III. Data**

The database for this study is taken from child support trials in Peru whose documentation (word format) is provided by the Judicial National Institution website (*Consulta de Expedientes Judiciales*, CEJ). This is public information and for each trial it is possible to download not only its verdict but also court hearings and related administrative procedures. We restricted the search of documents to trials performed in recent years to avoid incomplete information<sup>1</sup>.

The preliminary results showed in section V are based on 73 child maintenance trials<sup>2</sup> where a mother (plaintiff) sues a father (defendant). We collected the following variables from documents corresponding to those trials:

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<sup>1</sup> Before 2012, most of the courts do not upload documents.

<sup>2</sup> The data query at CEJ requires a code identifier of 20 digits. In our first attempt to collect verdicts of child maintenance trials, we made the query by first obtaining codes identifiers from a database (REDAM) which contains information of fathers who do not comply with verdict (complete names, amount owed and trial code identifier). However, the mapping from REDAM to CEJ performed poorly: out of 300 cases from REDAM, we found only 25 cases in CEJ (because of misinformation or absence of

- Amount of alimony demanded as child support. It is expressed either in monetary terms or as a percentage of the defendant's income.
- Alimony sentenced: the dictated amount of child support alimony in peruvian currency units (*nuevos soles*, hereafter S/.). However, when the demand is expressed in relative terms, the verdict is also given also in these terms.
- Characteristics of the children: gender and age. In most of the cases, there is one child involved. However, in some cases there are up to 3 children involved.
- Sex of the judges: inferred from name.
- Evidence presented by the defendant: declared income, family duties (if he has other children to support) and employment status.
- Evidence presented by the plaintiff: employment status, declared income and their version of the defendant's income.

As noted in the previous section, the law states that the defendant's income should play an important role in the judges' decision making process. However, determining the defendant's income is not an easy task because of two reasons. First, some defendants are considered 'rebels', which simply means they did not respond to the demand in due time; therefore, they do not show their pieces of evidence. In other words, the judge only observes the plaintiff's point of view, which in most cases is not based on concrete evidence (for instance, the defendant's income is only declared by the plaintiff without submitting any evidence). Therefore, under rebellion, judges face a difficult decision of to which extent they should take into account the information available to determine the defendant's income. In the sample of study, 42.4% are rebels.

Secondly, when rebellion does not occur, the defendant's income usually represents two monetary amounts: on one hand, the amount declared by the own defendant and, on the other hand, the amount declared by the plaintiff. Not surprisingly, we observe that plaintiffs tend to upwardly bias the defendant's income while defendants tend to downwardly bias their own income (sometimes, declaring zero earnings because of unemployment). This misinformation is supported by the informal labor institutions in Peru to which most of defendants belong. Thus, judges cannot obtain formal proofs of payment but only signed affidavits.

Fortunately, we know with certainty the amount of defendant's income of reference under three circumstances. First, when information of the defendant's income is either absent or considered

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uploaded documents). Next, we developed our own query algorithm at CEJ based on patterns found in code identifiers.

not credible by judges, they fix the minimum wage as a point of reference to determine the alimony. Second, in some cases the discrepancy between defendant and plaintiff ends where reliable proof (receipts from formal jobs) is provided and, as a result, the judge may use a reliable source of information. Finally, there are some cases where judges decide to believe in one side of the information (defendant or plaintiff) and they state it explicitly in their verdict.

Understanding this dataset and its issues is crucial for establishing the methodology as we will discuss in the next section.

#### **IV. Econometric specification and Identification Strategy**

The environment is a trial involving four agents: a plaintiff who demands  $d$ , defendant who earns income  $y$ , a judge who establishes alimony for child  $c$ . Next, we define the two outcomes of interest:

a) Punishment of defendant : alimony established by judge divided by income of defendant  $\frac{a}{y}$ .

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b) Success of plaintiff : alimony established by judge divided by amount demanded by plaintiff  $\frac{a}{d}$ .

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From those measures, we can explore if a female judge punishes fathers harder than male counterparts (by inspecting  $\frac{a}{y}$ ) and if a female judge grants more success to mothers than male counterparts (by inspecting  $\frac{a}{d}$ ). The ideal research design would be to have a female judge and a male judge analyzing the same trial and then compare the observed measures from both verdicts. Naturally, this is not feasible in the real world. The second best design occurs if the gender of judge is randomly allocated to each trial which, as we argued before, happens to be our case.

As revised in section II, the law states that the judge should establish the alimony by examining three issues: the need of the child, the defendant's income and defendant's obligations (mainly whether he has other children to take care of). Based on this institutional setting, we propose the following specifications to test the impact of the judge's sex on punishment and success:

Where  $age$  is the age of child (proxy of need),  $children$  is the number of additional children who depend on the defendant (proxy of obligations) and  $sex$  is the sex of judge. Finally,  $\epsilon_1$  and  $\epsilon_2$  are idiosyncratic errors for punishment and success. Thus, the methodology aims at studying the relationship between the judge's sex and the variance in punishment and success regarding child maintenance trials by inspecting on the estimates of  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ , respectively. Moreover, causal identification can be achieved through the particular Peruvian institutional design which provides a unique opportunity to establish causal links since judges are randomly assigned in this type of trials. This means the judge's sex is also randomly assigned and, therefore, uncorrelated with the observable and unobservable variables. Similar to Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010), the proposed study will implement a clean identification strategy to avoid endogeneity issues.

## V. Description and Analysis of Results

As we described in the data section, there are cases where the parties differ significantly in stating the defendant's income and, therefore, the judge has no clue of the reference point needed to establish the alimony. That means that neither the judge nor the econometrician observes  $income$ . In that sense, the 'punishment' measure will only be calculated for the three circumstances described in section III, for the cases where we know with certainty which is the amount of reference stated by the judge, a total of 46 observations. The 'success' measure, on the other hand, will be estimated for all 73 observations.

The following Table summarizes the main descriptive results of the study, and is divided in two Panels divided by 'rebelliousness': Panel A includes all cases and Panel B takes into account only the ones in which the defendants have been categorized as 'rebels'. This seemingly arbitrary division follows a simple logic: since the cases where the defendant is considered a 'rebel' lack concrete and formal evidence for his defense, information asymmetry will tend to be higher. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that changes in the direction of the verdicts will tend to be explained on a more frequent basis by the personal characteristics of the judges and their biases regarding the defendants.



**Table N°1: Punishment per child and success averages by judge's sex and total**

	Punishment of defendant per child			Success of plaintiff		
	Female judge	Male judge	Total	Female judge	Male judge	Total
<b>Panel A</b>	29.9%	28.7%	29.5%	48.1%	46.9%	47.7%
<b>Panel B</b>	35.2%	31.4%	34.2%	52.6%	49.1%	51.4%

Note: Punishment per child is the punishment measure divided by the number of children involved in the trial. Panel A includes all cases. Panel B includes only rebels.

The results showed in Table N°1 can be described as follows. When taking into account every case of the studied sample, the overall 'punishment' rate is 29.5% and the overall 'success' rate is 47.7%. This means that, on average, judges punish the defendants with one third of the income they take as reference; on the other hand, judges also tend to grant less than half of the amount of alimony demanded by the plaintiffs.

When we divide the sample by sex –still analyzing Panel A-, the results support our hypothesis descriptively. Female judges are observed to punish the defendants one percentage point stronger than their male counterparts. A similar observation can be made regarding the success measure: while female judges award the plaintiffs 48.1% of their demands, male judges award them 46.9% of it.

Asymmetry of information, on the other hand, seems to determine harsher judging. As Panel B observations show, the overall punishment rate is almost five percentage points higher than the one available for Panel A (34.2% vs. 29.5%). This tendency is also observed for the success rate: there is a four percentage point higher rate when the defendants are considered 'rebels' (51.4% vs. 47.7%).

What is more, in Panel B –when the defendants are considered 'rebels'- the gap between female and male judges is greater: almost four percentage points higher for the punishment rate and 3.5 percentage points higher for the success rate. This would mean that female judges are more sensitive to the 'rebelliousness' of the defendant and seem to punish them more in these cases.

This observations, however, are purely descriptive. In order to properly infer whether sex is actually a determinant of the degree of punishment or success in child support cases, we present now the main results of the regression analysis. Table N°2 summarizes them thoroughly.

**Table N°2: OLS estimates for punishment and success**

Dep. Var.	Punishment of defendant per child			Success of plaintiff		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Female judge	0.013 (0.032)	0.013 (0.030)	0.014 (0.033)	0.011 (0.046)	0.006 (0.046)	0.014 (0.049)
No of other children		-0.025 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.012)		-0.019 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.018)
Child's age			0.003 (0.003)			-0.000 (0.004)
Constant	0.287 (0.026)	0.303 (0.026)	0.276 (0.031)	0.471 (0.037)	0.487 (0.040)	0.480 (0.047)
No of obs.	46	46	44	72	72	69

Note: This table reports 3 different specifications depending on the covariates included for both punishment and success models. For instance, specification [1] includes only the dichotomous variable of judge's sex while [3] includes judge's sex, family duties and child's age. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

Table N°2 shows that the sex of the judge has a positive effect under all specifications for both punishment and success models. This means that, after controlling for defendant's obligations (measured as the number of additional children under his responsibility) and the need of the child (measure as the child's age), the positive sign remains consistent with our hypothesis that female judges punish defendants more and grant a higher degree of success to plaintiffs than their male counterparts. However, this result is not statistically significant. We will provide a discussion of this important matter at the end of this section.

Another interesting result taken from Table N°2 is that the defendant's obligations play a robust and important role in punishment and success. In fact, the systematic positive coefficient indicates that judges are effectively taking into account this information to lower both the punishment and success. Moreover, in the case of the punishment model, the defendant's obligations are statistically significant with a confidence level of 95%.

Finally, Table N°2 also shows that the coefficient for the age of the child exhibits different signs and lack of statistical significance in both punishment and success models, which would suggest that it is an irrelevant criterion when determining alimony. This result is surprising since, by law, the need of the child should be analyzed by exploring his or her age.

Regarding the lack of statistical significance for the coefficient corresponding to the sex criterion, there is ground to argue that this comes from the reduced number of observations we

were able to collect. First, as showed in Table N°1, descriptive statistics suggest a systemic bias from female judges in sentencing for child support alimony, especially in the cases where the defendant is categorized as ‘rebel’. Second, the regression results showed in Table N°2 exhibit systematically positive coefficients for the sex criterion for both models under all especifications, which supports our hypothesis. Taking together these two facts into account, it is reasonable to assume that a bigger sample would show the statistical significance needed to adequately test our hypothesis.

This failure to collect a bigger sample can be explained by the following experienced setbacks. To begin with, we faced several problems with the query system for finding the sentences. Examples of these are the interruption of the website service (CEJ) for several days, and the absence of uploaded files for sentences that were advertised to have all the information possible, among others. However, during the last week of research we were able to develop a more efficient algorithm to perform the query. Were we to have more than one month to gather a sufficient number of observations, we are sure that come the day of the Conference we will be able to present not only more solid estimates but a better analysis with statistically significant results. Indeed, we think that the construction of this microdata will provide economists, social scientists, and researchers in general the opportunity to extend the research frontier in this topic and to bring closer previously unanswerable questions within reach. We hope the organizeers of the ALACDE conference consider this matter when evaluating the study.

## **VI. Implications and Conclusion**

Both the descriptive and inferential statistical analysis suggest that our hypothesis is correctly conceptualized. Female judges both tend to punish the defendants more than their male counterparts and also grant a higher degree of success to the plaintiff’s demand, even when controlling for other covariates. Regrettably, due to the fact that we were not able to collect a bigger sample for the study, our results do not hold for statistical significance. Granted, this is a major setback for the purposes of this study.

However, it is possible to describe some implications for the preliminar results we found. To begin with, the sign of the regression coefficients would suggest that male judges are not the ones who drive ‘gender identity norms’ (Bertrand et al., 2013): women are. In particular, the stereotypical belief that a woman’s role is to take care of the home while men should act as the providers. This would prove counterproductive in the following sense: by trying to ‘defend’ her sex or gender, a female judge might be actually weakening a more egalitarian treatment and definition of gender roles.

More importantly, though, significant results would posit that sentences are not neutral in nature and biased against men, contrary to one what would expect in child support cases or in any type of judicial proceeding for that matter. The gender dynamics in child support cases, therefore, beg for a redesign of familiar law and, specifically, for objective criteria regarding alimony sentencing.

A sensible policy recommendation would be to take from systems such as the American, Canadian or French –to cite some cases revised in this study-: this would be an important step forward correcting the sex-based biases. However, further quantitative and causal research is needed: this study aims to begin to fill this place.

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**ANNEX A: Sentences used for this study**

<b>EXPEDIENTE</b>	<b>APELLIDOS</b>		<b>NOMBRES</b>
00001-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	CHARAPAQUI	DE LA CRUZ	EDISON
00006-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	REQUENA	CHARAPAQUI	ROSSI
00007-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-02	RAMOS	ARANA	WILDER
00008-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	ROJAS	YAURI	FRANCISCO PAULINO
00009-2013-0-2701-JP-FC-01	GARCIA	NIETO	GIL AUGUSTO
00017-2014-0-1408-JP-FC-01	MARQUEZ	MENDOZA	WALTER
00024-2011-0-1804-JP-FC-01	TOVAR	BERNARDINO	RUBEN DARIO
00031-2012	PEDRAZA	PALOMINO	SANTOS VICTOR
00045-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-02	MANTARI	SAIRITUPAC	DEYVI JONNATAN
00049-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-02	HUAMANI	CASTRO	DIEGO EDISON
00051-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-02	BOZA	HUAMAN	ABRAHAM
00056-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-02	ZARAVIA	VILLANUEVA	ALEXANDER
00057-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	MACHUCA	SOTACURO	VICENTE
00060-2015-0-0313-JP-FC-03	AYBAR	CHIPA	RUBEN
00066-2015-0-0313-JP-FC-03	CHIPA	QUISPE	CECILIO
00067-2015-0-0313-JP-FC-03	RETAMOZO	SALINAS	FORTUNATO
00071-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	CALLE	MARCAS	CESAR ARMANDO
00074-2015-0-0313-JP-FC-03	RINCON	CAMARGO	DIONICIO
00078-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	QUISPE	ESTEBAN	ROBERT
00089-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-01	TAIPE	CAMBILLO	JUAN CARLOS
00091-2015-0-1101-JP-FC-02	DE LA CRUZ	FLORES	EVARISTO DOMINGO
00094-2014-0-2506-JP-FC-01	BARRON	BELEVAN	BALDOMIR RODOLFO
00112-2013-0-1804-JP-FC-01	JOAQUIN	MAYTA	WILMER
00230-2014-0-0301-JP-FC-02	MENDOZA	RISCO	VICTOR
00235-2013-0-2701-JP-FC-01	MAMANI	HUAYLLINO	SAMUEL
00238-2013-0-2701-JP-FC-01	TICONA	QUISPE	EDUARDO
00239-2013-0-2701-JP-FC-01	TORRES	SANGAMA	VALENTIN JAVIER
00241-2013-0-2701-JP-FC-01	SOLORZANO	HUANUIRE	LINDER PAULINO
00279-2012-0-1824-JP-FC-01	UGAZ	ROBINSON	CARLOS ANTONIO
00344-2011-0-2701-JP-FC-01	VILLAGRA	VALDIVIA	THAMAR HUGO
00345-2011-0-2701-JP-FC-01	CORDOVA	MEJIA	CESAR
00346-2011-0-2701-JP-FC-01	AGUILAR	POMARI	EDGAR
00347-2011-0-2701-JP-FC-01	QUISPE	ZAVALA	GUIDO
00349-2011-0-2701-JP-FC-01	QUISPE	PAREDES	BERNARDO
00352-2011-0-2701-JP-FC-01	CONDORI	CONDORI	WALTER
00422-2011-0-3209-JP-FC-01	CASIMIRO	SOLORZANO	ALEX MIGUEL
00442-2012-0-1815-JP-FC-03	ACOSTA	BELTRAN	ARTURO GIANCARLO
00495-2014-0-1101-JP-FC-01	ESTEBAN	CURASMA	HECTOR
00509-2013-0-1824-JP-FC-01	QUIJANO	LA TORRE	VICTOR HUGO
00510-2012-0-1408-JP-FC-01	MARCOS	TASAYCO	ROBERTO CARLOS
00573-2014-0-2701-JP-FC-01	PACCAYA	HUAYHUA	WALTER

00612-2010-0-3207-JP-FC-01	BARBOZA	PARIONA	ALVARO BENITO
00682-2012-0-1601-JP-FC-06	LUJAN	MANTILLA	TITO JOEL
00731-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	MARTINEZ	TASAYCO	ALFREDO
00787-2008-0-0201-JR-FC-01	VALENZUELA	PAUCAR	BENEDICTO APOLONIO
00789-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	TITO	DE LA CRUZ	CHRISTIAN DAVID
00799-2013-0-1814-JP-FC-03	GARCIA	LOZANO	TEOFILO CARLOS
00802-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	CASTILLO	PADILLA	JUAN VÍCTOR
00805-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	ADRIAN	GONZALES	VANESSA
00820-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	PÉREZ	CORRO	ISAI OTONIEL
00820-2014-0-1001-JP-FC-02	AMAO	DIAZ	CARLOS
00832-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	DE LA CRUZ	HERNANDEZ	JOSE MANUEL
00833-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	CARBAJAL	PACHAS	JUAN CARLOS
00843-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	CARTAGENA	VILLA	ARISTIDES AGUSTIN
00848-2012-0-1801-JP-FC-07	CARHUALLANQUI	MANRIQUE	STEEBBY MAURO
00849-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-02	LAVANDA	REATEGUI	MIGUEL
00855-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-02	TALLA	MUCHAYPIÑA	PERCY OMAR
00866-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	MARCOS	TASAYCO	ROBERTO CARLOS
00872-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	ARAOZ	QUISPE	SAMUEL DAVID
00885-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	SOTELO	LUNA	FIDEL SANTOS RAFAEL
00886-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	BERRIOS	TAPIA	HECTOR JOSE
00895-2012-0-2601-JP-FC-05	CHORRES	INFANTE	LUIS DARIO
00895-2013-0-1408-JP-FC-01	AGUIRRE	CHAVEZ	JOSE
00898-2012-0-2601-JP-FC-05	VILLEGAS	MORE	ALEX YUNIOR
00905-2012-0-2601-JP-FC-05	TARMA	IZQUIERDO	CARLOS EDSON JOAO
00906-2012-0-2601-JP-FC-05	SILVA	MARTINEZ	JEAN JOULE
01056-2009-0-0201-JP-FC-02	BENANCIO	DURAN	SILVER JESUS
01270-2011-0-1815-JP-FC-02	MALCA	ARRIBASPLATA	ALEX
01521-2014-0-1601-JP-FC-02	ORBEGOZO	CHAVARRY	ANTONIO JOSE
01656-2012-0-1601-JP-FC-03	ROSILLO	AZABACHE	VICTOR ERNESTO
02040-2010-0-1601-JP-FC-06	QUEZADA	LUJAN	CARLOS FREDDY
02057-2010-0-1601-JP-FC-01	LOPEZ	PELAEZ	ALAN GABRIEL
02544-2013-0-1601-JP-FC-06	LUCIANO	MELENDEZ	WILFREDO JESUS